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Abstract
The global oil shock in 1973-74 occurred at a time when Spain was embarking on a
liberalization of its financial system that resulted in many new entrants, particularly smalland medium-sized institutions. The banking crisis that followed from 1977-85 affected 52 of
the country’s 110 banks, most of them of small- and medium-sized, that comprised over 20%
of bank deposits. Spain established the Deposit Guarantee Fund in November 1977 to
provide limited deposit insurance, and, in March 1978, established a Banking Corporation to
take control of and reorganize troubled banks. However, because the Banking Corporation
lacked the legal authority to recapitalize institutions, Spain reconstituted the Deposit
Guarantee Fund in 1980 with broad new powers. One key power was the ability to acquire
and dispose of non-performing assets from insolvent institutions. During the course of the
crisis, the Fund intervened in 29 banks. It acquired a total of 373 billion pesetas ($2.2 billion)
in nonperforming assets, real estate, and shareholdings. It disposed of more than 50% of bad
assets within five years, but by 2000 still had a small amount of assets. By 1986, it had
accumulated losses of 90 billion pesetas.

Keywords: Spain, crisis, banks, asset management company, Fund, NPLs

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the Global Financial Crisis that pertain to broad-based asset
management company programs.
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Spain: Deposit Guarantee Fund Asset Management
At a Glance
During the 1960s and early 1970s, Spain
experienced strong economic growth. However,
by the mid-1970s difficulties arose. The global
increase in oil prices in 1973-74 contributed to
double-digit inflation in Spain. Reforms in 1971
and 1974 paved the way for swift financial
liberalization without adequate regulation and
supervision.
In 1977, Spain entered a banking crisis that
lasted until 1985. It affected 52 of the country’s
110 banks, most of them small- and mediumsized, that together comprised over 20% of bank
deposits. In November 1977, Spain established a
Deposit Guarantee Fund run by the Bank of Spain
to provide limited deposit insurance, and, in
March 1978, a Banking Corporation to take
control of and reorganize troubled banks was
added. However, because the Banking
Corporation lacked the legal authority to
recapitalize institutions, Spain reconstituted the
Deposit Guarantee Fund in 1980 as an
independent public agency with broad new
powers. One key power was the ability to acquire
and dispose of non-performing assets from
insolvent institutions. During the course of the
crisis, the Fund intervened in 29 banks. It
acquired a total of 373 billion pesetas ($2.2
billion) in assets, including 270 billion pesetas in
loans at face value, 31 billion pesetas in real
estate, and 72 billion in shareholdings. It
disposed of more than 50% of non-performing
assets within five years, but still had a small
amount of assets by 2000.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: “To guarantee deposits in banking
institutions in the way and to the extent that the
government establishes, and also to carry out any
such actions as it considers necessary to reinforce
the solvency and proper functioning of the banks,
in the [defense] of their interests of their
depositors and the Fund itself”
Launch Dates
Established: March 28, 1980
Wind-down Dates

Date of Last Asset Disposal:
Unknown. Still operating as
of 2000

Size and Type of
NPL Problem

Nonperforming loans to total
loans of 5.7% in 1985
All loan types

Program Size

Not specified at outset

Eligible
Institutions

Nonviable banks that could
not be recapitalized by
shareholders
Closed banks only

Usage

373 billion pesetas acquired
at face value ($2.2 billion)

Outcomes

90
billion
pesetas
in
accumulated losses as of
1986

Ownership
Structure

Public

Notable Features

Multiple functions carried
out by one public-private
entity in the face of a crisis
limited to small- and
medium-sized banks

Summary Evaluation
There is limited evaluation of the Fund despite its central, multi-purpose role in dealing with
the Spanish banking crisis (1977-85). Observers have praised its structure and approach to
dealing with the crisis, but contextual factors such as a weak legal framework for transferring
titles and seizing collateral restricted its efforts at rapid asset disposal. By 1986, the Fund
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had accumulated losses of 90 billion pesetas in total, including its asset management
operations.

83

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 2

Deposit Guarantee Fund Asset Management: Spain Context
GDP
$214.6 billion in 1979
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$232.8 billion in 1980
GDP per capita
$5,770 in 1979
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$6,209 in 1980
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt)
No ratings data as of 1979 and
1980
Size of banking system
$162.0 billion in 1979
$178.8 billion in 1980
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
75.5% in 1979
76.7% in 1980
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial Data not available in 1979 and
system
1980
Data not available in 1979 and
Five-bank concentration of banking system
1980
Data not available in 1979 and
Foreign involvement in banking system
1980
% in 1979
Government ownership of banking system
% in 1980
Yes in 1979
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes in 1980
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank, Sheng 1996.
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I. Overview
Background
During the 1960s and early 1970s, Spain experienced strong economic growth. Annual GDP
growth averaged 7% from 1961 to 1974.3 However, in the mid-1970s, developments
emerged that ultimately brought this period of rapid economic expansion to a halt. The
global increase in oil prices in 1973 and 1974 contributed to double-digit inflation in Spain.
The death of Francisco Franco in 1975 accelerated the political transformation from
dictatorship to democracy. Additionally, reforms in 1971 and 1974 paved the way for a swift
financial liberalization in the Spanish banking system. These reforms facilitated the opening
of new branches and deregulated deposit interest rates and multiple lending rates (De Juan
2019; Sheng 1996).
Between 1973 and 1983, the number of bank offices more than tripled, with significant
growth in small and medium-sized institutions. Employment in the banking sector increased
from 150,000 in 1975 to more than 180,000 in 1980. This expansion came alongside
regulation and supervision that were considered inadequate. And while the banking sector
became more innovative and complex, a number of the new entrants lacked banking
experience, and in some cases, ethical standards (Sheng 1996).
In 1977, problems in the Spanish banking system—composed of 110 banks—became
apparent. A number of insolvent banks characterized their problems as temporary liquidity
problems. The Bank of Spain, as lender of last resort, dealt with liquidity problems using its
rediscount facility but identified that in many cases, these liquidity problems masked
solvency issues. Failed banks had typically breached limits on exposure to related parties or
single entities (De Juan 2019; Sheng 1996).
The Bank of Spain lacked experience in dealing with banks in crisis, which made it difficult
to identify bank losses accurately. The small group of examiners performed supervision
primarily on regulatory compliance (De Juan 2019). At the same time, the Bank of Spain had
no ability to sanction wrongdoers, and had no means, nor the legal powers to prevent a bank
failure (Sheng 1996).
In November of 1977, as a first response to the escalating problems in the banking sector,
the Spanish legislature created the Deposit Guarantee Fund (Fund), administered as an
account within the Bank of Spain.4 It provided deposit insurance for up to 500,000 pesetas
(approximately $10,000).5 Its ongoing operations were funded equally by the Bank of Spain
and banks, which each contributed 0.1% of all bank deposits (Deposit Guarantee Fund 1981).
These funds, however, could only be used to return funds to depositors after a bank was
closed (Sheng 1996). In January 1978, Spain passed legislation that allowed the Fund, for
See Appendix A: Macroeconomic indicators (1970-89) for data on GDP growth, inflation, and the exchange
rate.
4 See Appendix B for the timeline of legislation during the Spanish Banking crisis (1977-85).
5 Based on an average exchange rate of 1997 approximately Spanish pesetas 50 = $1 USD (Sheng 1996).
3
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reasons of public interest and with a three-fourths approval from the Fund’s advisory
committee, to use the funds when a distressed bank was in danger of insolvency, rather than
wait for the bank’s liquidation (Spain 1978).
In March 1978, the Bank of Spain created a public-private management company called the
Banking Corporation (Corporación Bancaria S.A.) to complement the deposit insurance
scheme of the Fund. The Corporation would be a resolution authority: it would take over,
clean up, and sell banks in crisis (Sheng 1996). The Corporation started with a fund of 500
million pesetas, which came from equal contributions by the Bank of Spain and the banking
industry (Malo de Molina and Martín-Aceña 2011). If the existing shareholders were
unwilling or unable to recapitalize a bank, the Corporation gained ownership and,
eventually, management rights of the bank by buying a controlling interest of shares for one
peseta—a symbolic price—per share (Sheng 1996). It would then seek a buyer for the bank.
The Bank of Spain required this intervention as a condition for accessing its newly created
liquidity facility (De Juan 2019). The first bank intervention by the Corporation occurred in
March 1978 (Seminario 1984).
However, the Corporation lacked the legal authority to recapitalize insolvent institutions and
struggled to sell “rehabilitated” banks. The Corporation did not close until many years later
due to legal battles. In 1980, the Spanish government reconstituted the Deposit Guarantee
Fund as a separate legal entity and granted it legal powers to intervene and “rehabilitate”
banks in a crisis. Unlike the Corporation, the government gave the Fund the power to inject
capital and to purchase and manage non-performing assets (Sheng 1996; Malo de Molina
and Martín-Aceña 2011).
Program Description
In March of 1980, the passage of Royal Decree-Law 4/1980 reconstituted the Fund as a
public body governed by the rules of private law (Spain 1980). The enhanced Fund combined
the deposit guarantee scheme with the management activities previously performed by the
Corporation, but now with increased legal powers. Initially, it was independent from the
Corporation, but later the Fund acquired the Corporation’s working teams (Malo de Molina
and Martín-Aceña 2011). More specifically, beyond deposit insurance, the Fund was now
empowered “… to carry out any such actions as it considers necessary to reinforce the
solvency and proper functioning of the banks, in the [defense] of their interests of their
depositors and the Fund itself” (Spain 1980). The Fund became known as the “Bank Hospital”
(De Juan 2019).
The new powers enabled the Fund to recapitalize a distressed bank, make it viable, and sell
it to another bank within a year. The Fund could gain bank ownership, extend credit to banks
at any rate or in any form, acquire all types of assets (shares, loans, real estate, etc.) at book
value, provide guarantees to acquiring banks, absorb losses to restore solvency, and
recapitalize banks and nonbanks. While the Bank of Spain continued to provide emergency
liquidity as lender of last resort, it was through the Fund that insolvency problems were
addressed (De Juan 2019).
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The Board of Directors of the newly constituted Fund followed the model adopted by the
Corporation, with eight members—half from the Bank of Spain and half from the banking
industry. The Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain served as the chair and would cast the
decisive vote in the event of a tie (De Juan 2019). The Secretary General of the Fund acted as
the executive director and managed a staff of 120 employees at its peak (Klingebiel 2000).
Contributions to the Fund remained equally distributed between the Bank of Spain and the
banking industry. Banks’ contributions ranged from 0.1% to 0.3% of deposits. Legislation
also authorized the Bank of Spain to make long-term loans to the Fund at the rediscount rate,
and with no limit (De Juan 2019). The Fund’s total debt was 506 billion pesetas at the end of
1986 (Deposit Guarantee Fund 1987). The Fund closely coordinated its operations with the
Bank of Spain. In providing initial liquidity support to troubled banks, the Bank of Spain
would evaluate their viability. Those banks identified as needing additional capital would be
asked to have their shareholders provide capital. Banks whose shareholders were unwilling
or unable to provide that capital were then forced to transfer control of the banks to the Fund
at a nominal price; otherwise, they faced the loss of liquidity support from the Bank of Spain
and possible suspension of their banking charter (Sheng 1996).
Once the Fund gained majority ownership via this mechanism, new management would
come in and clean up the bank. The Fund would force the banks’ directors to resign. If they
refused to resign, the Fund fired them directly after gaining control of the bank. In all cases,
the Fund recruited new executives from the market, appointed a new Board, and
restructured management (De Juan 2019). The newly appointed management would
introduce administrative reforms and enhance operational efficiency. The Fund’s
interventions rested on the assumption that banks would remain viable even after the Fund
concluded its support (Sheng 1996). The Fund would then implement a financial package to
attract a buyer.
The main measure that the Fund took to attract buyers was to acquire a bank’s nonperforming assets at face value. In doing so, the Fund absorbed substantial losses that
typically exceeded the bank’s capital (De Juan 2019). The Fund purchased the nonperforming assets of the insolvent banks at face value because Spanish authorities
considered it impossible to agree on a market price (De Juan 2019). The Fund would end up
purchasing a large portion of non-performing assets, which it could sell even after the Fund
released control of the bank (Sheng 1996).
After a bank was “rehabilitated,” the Fund prepared to sell it to a “healthy” bank that could
meet the qualifications and solvency requirements. By law, the offer had to be publicized and
occur within a year after the Fund gained control of the bank (De Juan 2019). If a suitable
buyer appeared right away, the Fund would try to sell the bank immediately with the
intention to avert any further loss of confidence in the bank and depletion of its capital base.
In some cases, an external accounting firm would conduct a comprehensive audit and
identify potential buyers (Sheng 1996).
The Fund, together with the Bank of Spain, arranged a prospectus for the sale of a troubled
bank with a deadline for bids. The prospectus would be sent to selected domestic and foreign
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banks and included the maximum value of and specific conditions in which bad assets could
be carved out by the Fund. This turned out to be a key issue in negotiations between the Fund
and potential buyers. The offer also outlined the specifics on the support to be provided by
the Fund and the Bank of Spain (e.g. subsidized interest rates, regulatory forbearance,
guarantees against “hidden liabilities,” etc.). Potential buyers could make counterproposals,
which the Fund’s Board of Directors would review. Buyers were required to renounce any
future claims or legal actions against the Fund that would result from differences between
expected and realized asset returns. Lastly, the Board would communicate to the Ministry of
Finance the offer chosen. Then, the Ministry had fifteen days to exercise its option to
purchase the shares when the national interest was a concern. This two-stage mechanism
provided checks and balances to the restructuring efforts (Sheng 1996).
As for the loans that the Fund could not sell to the new investors of a bank, sale of mortgage
loans and real estate were most successful (Klingebiel 2000). In every instance, the Fund
tried to minimize losses by maximizing recovery of assets acquired at face value, and by
repossessing any guarantees collected as collateral for nonperforming loans (Sheng 1996).
Outcomes
The Spanish banking crisis of 1977-85 affected 52 of the country’s 110 banks—most of them
of small- and medium-size—that comprised over 20% of bank deposits (De Juan 2019). Of
all the banks affected by the crisis, 90% were established between 1973 and 1978. None of
the banks established during the financial liberalization of the 1970s survived as an
independent bank. By 1985, 85% of total deposits were held by eight banking groups. The
seven largest Spanish banks were minimally affected by the crisis and together with the
Spanish Bankers’ Association, established in 1977, assisted in resolving almost all of the
small failed banks, although under considerable pressure from the government (Sheng
1996).
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Figure 1: Banks Affected by the Crisis, 1978-84
Year

Number
Deposits and Credits in
Number of
of Banks
$ Million*
Accounts
Treated
(Thousands)
Deposits
Credits
Total
1978
4
245
145
390
185
1979
2
214
51
265
201
1980
9
1,361
325
1,686
775
1981
4
564
294
858
362
1982
11
3,415
872
4,287
1,829
1983
21
4,859
1,686
6,545
1,946
1984
1
270
16
286
110
Total
52
10,928
3,389
14,317
5,408
Exchange rate of 1984 was Spanish Pesetas 175 = $1 USD.

Number
of
Branches
120
61
371
151
726
1,193
33
2,655

Staff
1,977
1,026
6,553
2,143
10,761
13,204
625
36,289

Source: De Juan 2019.

Three small banks were liquidated. The Fund intervened in 29 banks with assets amounting
to 1% of the financial system. Spain dealt with 20 banks related to the “politically sensitive”
Rumasa industrial conglomerate outside of the Fund, through a special nationalization and
reprivatization program in 1983 (Klingebiel 2000; Sheng 1996).6
By law, the Fund had to release control of a bank within a year of takeover, encouraging quick
resolution and resale. By 1985, 22 banks were sold to domestic banks and five to foreign
banks (Sheng 1996). Banks restructured by the Fund were sold after an average of 13
months, including the 20 banks of the Rumasa group. Many cases were resolved within six
months (Sheng 1996; De Juan 2019). Initially, Spanish domestic banks were not interested
in acquiring the “rehabilitated” banks. However, after the Fund sold two banks to foreign
institutions, Spanish banks—in light of foreign competition—were incentivized to buy banks
from the Fund, even by absorbing short-term losses in some cases (Sheng 1996; Klingebiel
2000). None of the banks sold by the Fund suffered a relapse (De Juan 2019).

In 1983, the Rumasa group of more than 200 industrial companies and 20 banks of small and medium size
was nationalized instead of being rehabilitated via the Fund. The case was politically sensitive, in part because
the Rumasa group employed over 50,000 people. The financial resources required to rescue Rumasa would
have greatly exceeded the Fund’s capacity: the companies were highly leveraged, and the banks exhibited
negative capital of 21 billion pesetas ($146 million). Spanish authorities viewed intervening in Rumasa’s banks
via the Fund as likely to trigger the failure of its industrial companies. However, they rejected any Fund
assistance for Rumasa’s non-bank companies as inappropriate to the Fund’s mission (Sheng 1996).
6
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Figure 2: Bank Interventions by Deposit Guarantee Fund, 1978-85

Interventions from 1978 until March 1980 were performed by the Corporation (Corporación
Bancaria S.A.).
Source: Sheng 1996.
In all instances, bank shareholders took the first losses by losing their equity. Depositors only
experienced losses when the three small banks were liquidated. Losses absorbed by the
Fund after taking control of banks were split equally among the Bank of Spain and the
banking industry. Contributions from the banks totaled 0.12% of liabilities per year (10% of
annual profits). By the end of 1984, these contributions reached only $0.5 billion,
significantly less than the total losses incurred by the Fund. Therefore, the Bank of Spain had
to lend an additional $2.9 billion to the Fund through long-term loans at a 7.25% annual
interest rate (Sheng 1996).
The Fund would restructure the banks with the objective to sell them. To clean up the banks,
the Fund acquired 373 billion pesetas in total assets: 270 billion in loans, 31 billion in real
estate, and 73 billion in shareholdings. The Fund continued with the asset purchases through
1985, and in line with the rapid-asset-disposition objective, disposed of more than 50% of
them within five years. By 1986, it registered losses of 25.7 billion pesetas for cleaning up
the banks and a cumulative 90 billion pesetas of overall losses. By 2000, the Fund only held
a small fraction of the assets it had acquired (Klingebiel 2000).
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The Fund’s estimates suggested it would be able to repay the Bank of Spain’s loans
completely by the end of the 1990s, based on its reserves (Sheng 1996). However, it is not
clear from public sources whether the Bank of Spain or Spanish taxpayers ultimately bore
losses on these loans to the Fund. The Fund’s debt was 506 billion pesetas at the end of 1986
and 349 billion pesetas at the end of 1989 (El Pais 1990; Deposit Guarantee Fund 1987).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a Package: The Deposit Guarantee Fund was a multi-purpose facility that
combined purchases of non-performing assets with other types of interventions
such as deposit insurance, capital injections, and guarantees.
Two early attempts by the Spanish government to address the banking crisis that emerged
in 1977—the initial establishment of the Deposit Guarantee Fund merely as a deposit
insurance provider and the establishment of the Banking Corporation in 1978 to take control
of troubled banks—addressed liquidity problems but could not solve underlying solvency
issues. Spain therefore decided to significantly expand the legal authority of the Fund to
include the ability to purchase assets, inject capital, and provide guarantees to acquiring
banks, so that these tools could be used in tandem to rehabilitate failed banks.
After the Bank of Spain identified a significant capital shortage in a bank, the Fund would
take over ownership of the distressed banks. The Fund would assess the bank’s financial
situation, replace management, and determine a financial assistance package to return the
bank to viability and reprivatize the bank. One significant component of the Fund’s ability to
resell the banks was the purchase of assets, which would make the bank more attractive in
a bidding procedure among solvent banks (De Juan 2019).
2. Legal Authority: Spain passed the Royal-Decree Law 4/1980 on March 28, 1980,
to significantly expand the legal authority of the Fund, giving it the ability to
purchase assets among other new powers.
In March 1980, the passage of Royal Decree-Law 4/1980 established the Deposit Guarantee
Fund for Banking Institutions as a public body governed by the rules of private law and
significantly expanded its authority (Spain 1980). The enhanced Fund combined the deposit
guarantee scheme with the management function performed up until this point by the
Banking Corporation, but now with increased legal powers. The Fund became known as the
“Bank Hospital” (De Juan 2019).
3. Special Powers: The Fund had the authority to recapitalize distressed banks, take
over bank ownership, provide credit or guarantees, and acquire any type of asset.
Special authority was granted to the Fund when it was reconstituted in 1980, after it became
clear that the Banking Corporation’s powers, specifically its inability to recapitalize banks,
were “inadequate … for dealing with impending crises” (Sheng 1991). The Fund was granted
authority to recapitalize distressed banks, take over bank ownership, extend credit to banks
at any rate or in any form, acquire assets at book value, provide guarantees to an acquiring
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institution, and absorb losses to restore banks to solvency (De Juan 2019). The Fund
remained responsible for the administration of the deposit insurance scheme (Sheng 1991).
4. Mandate: The Fund had a broad mandate to protect depositors, restructure
banks, and restore bank solvency; for its asset management functions, it had the
objective to quickly dispose of assets and maximize recovery.
In 1980, the Fund’s mandate expanded beyond its initial objective to protect depositors and
prevent bank runs. The Fund was mandated “to carry out all the operations deemed
necessary to reinforce the solvency and operation of the banks, in [defense] of the interest
of the depositors and of the Fund itself” (Sheng 1996; Spain 1980).
After the Fund became the primary owner of a distressed bank, it developed a financial
assistance package, which could include the purchase of assets and long-term lending. The
financial assistance package was an important factor for the eventual sale of a bank, as the
Fund could carve out bad assets that a buyer would be unwilling to take on (Klingebiel 2000).
After reaching a sales agreement, the Fund would purchase the nonperforming assets at
book value and then manage and liquidate the assets (De Juan 2019). The Fund was required
to resell the bank within one year, and it had the objective to maximize recovery value on the
problem assets it acquired (Klingebiel 2000).
5. Communication: Spain described the expansion of the Fund’s authority as part of
its efforts to protect depositors, particularly small depositors.
The stated purpose of the Fund as it was reconstituted in 1980 was “to guarantee the
deposits held in banking institutions in the way and to the extent that the government
establishes, and also to carry out any such actions as it considers necessary to reinforce the
solvency and proper functioning of the banks, in the [defense] of their interests of their
depositors and of the Fund itself” (Spain 1980).
The Deposit Guarantee Fund issued annual reports detailing its operations (Deposit
Guarantee Fund 1981; 1987). The Fund also had an Administration and Control department
responsible for financial recordkeeping and preparing the annual budget and financial plan
(Sheng 1996). Furthermore, the governance structure of the Fund and its relationship to the
Bank of Spain “fostered a public perception of fairness” (Sheng 1996).
6. Ownership Structure: The Deposit Guarantee Fund was government-owned.
The Fund was publicly owned and “operated as an independent public agency under
private law” (Klingebiel 2000).
7. Governance/Administration: The Fund was governed by a Board of Directors
composed half of representatives of the Bank of Spain and half of representatives
of the banking industry.
The Board of Directors consisted of eight members—four bankers from industry and four
Directors from the Bank of Spain. The Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain served as chair
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and cast the decisive vote in the case of a tie. The four bankers served in their individual
capacities and not as representatives of their banks. They were nominated by the Bank of
Spain and appointed by the Ministry of Economy (De Juan 2019).
The operations of the Fund were closely coordinated with the Bank of Spain, especially in
the initial and final stages of a bank intervention.
The responsibilities of the Board of Directors of the Fund included:
a) Informing and advising the Bank of Spain on the Fund’s operations;
b) Preparing and approving the Fund’s financial statements, and requesting advances
from the Bank of Spain to the Fund when necessary;
c) Notifying the Bank of Spain which banks experienced financial difficulties that could
require Fund intervention;
d) Determining the form of payment of annual premiums contributed by the banks;
e) Stipulating the requirements for admitting new banks to the Fund, and informing of
any changes in membership;
f) Requesting external audits of member banks and determining the frequency and
extent of these audits, and if necessary requesting external audits of associated
companies;
g) Suspending payment of deposit guarantees to any depositor directly associated with
the financial troubles of a bank;
h) Authorizing asset purchases from banks in crisis, explicitly limiting further
involvement of the Fund, and without precluding requests to the bank management
to take further remedial actions (Sheng 1996).
The Fund was comprised of three departments: Legal, Administration and Control, and Asset
Management. The Legal Department could start legal or criminal action against former
administrators of banks the Fund intervened on or temporarily controlled. It also served as
legal counsel for the other departments (Sheng 1996).
The Department of Administration and Control oversaw internal matters of the Fund and of
the banks controlled by the Fund. It was responsible for the recovery of claims, maintaining
timely records, and servicing obligations of fixed assets (e.g. property taxes). The
Department coordinated the sale of assets and bank reprivatizations with the other
Departments. It prepared the Fund’s annual budget and financial plan, and requested
advances from the Bank of Spain to the Fund when necessary (Sheng 1996).
The Asset Management Department administered the sale of assets owned by the Fund that
were not directly related to banking. It assessed their financial viability, minimized any
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additional financial commitments, and attempted to sell the best assets as fast as possible.
The Department appraised, or subcontracted appraisal of, the fixed assets of the Fund. It also
focused on improving the least attractive assets while it searched for buyers (Sheng 1996).
8. Size: There was no pre-defined limit on the scope of the Fund’s purchases of nonperforming assets.
The legislation that established the Fund did not set a size limit on the Fund’s asset
purchases. In total, it acquired 270 billion pesetas in loans at face value, 31 billion pesetas in
real estate, and 72 billion in equity in banks (Klingebiel 2000).
9. Funding Source: The Fund was funded primarily by loans from the Bank of Spain;
the Fund would repay those loans over time with the help of annual, equal equity
contributions from the Bank of Spain and the banking industry.
The Fund met its annual costs with the help of equal contributions from the Bank of Spain
and the banking industry. Also, by law, the Bank of Spain could make long-term loans to the
Fund at the rediscount rate, with no limit (De Juan 2019). Ultimately, the Bank of Spain
provided substantial loans to the Fund, which the Fund expected to pay back over time
through asset sales and the continuing contributions from the banks and the Bank of Spain.
The industry’s and the Bank of Spain’s annual contributions each equaled between 0.1% and
0.3% of all bank deposits of member banks (De Juan 2019). Initially, annual contributions
were set at 0.1% (Spain 1980). Contributions from the banks totaled 0.12% of liabilities per
year (10% of annual profits). By the end of 1984, these contributions reached only $0.5
billion, significantly less than the total losses absorbed. Therefore, the Bank of Spain had to
lend $2.9 billion to the Fund through long-term loans at a 7.25% annual interest rate (Sheng
1996).
The Fund’s estimates suggested it would be able to repay the Bank of Spain’s loans
completely by the end of the 1990s, based on its reserves (Sheng 1996). However, it is not
clear from public sources whether the Bank of Spain or Spanish taxpayers ultimately bore
losses on these loans to the Fund. The Fund’s debt was 506 billion pesetas at the end of 1986
and 349 billion pesetas at the end of 1989 (Deposit Guarantee Fund 1987; El Pais 1990).
10. Eligible Institutions: The Fund intervened in banks identified as non-viable
whose shareholders did not recapitalize them.
Typically, the Bank of Spain would provide initial liquidity support to struggling banks and
in doing so determine the viability of the recipients. In some cases, the Bank of Spain
determined that a bank would be viable if remedial actions were taken, and agreed to a plan
of action. In other cases, the central bank identified and assessed the extent of insolvency
and demanded recapitalization by existing shareholders with the threat that the Fund would
take control unless such recapitalization occurred. The Bank of Spain allowed Fund
appraisers to be involved in the assessments so the Fund could be better prepared to tackle
specific problems, even before acquiring full control of the bank (Sheng 1996).
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Insolvent banks were pressured to recapitalize or give control to the Fund. Banks whose
shareholders were unwilling to recapitalize them could stop receiving liquidity support from
the Bank of Spain and even lose their license to operate. The General Corporate Law was
amended to reduce the quorum of shareholders necessary to approve recapitalizations. This
allowed the Fund to expedite the process of interventions in insolvent banks (Sheng 1996).
The Fund gained control of a bank at a shareholders meeting, which had to be convened
within seven days of the Bank of Spain requesting it. The Bank of Spain would inform
shareholders of the scope of the problems the institution faced, such as the extent of losses
and the effect of write-offs on bank capital and reserves. If the bank had no capital and its
shareholders were unwilling to recapitalize it, they had to “volunteer” to sell capital to the
Fund for a symbolic price of one peseta per share. This price could be more if the bank’s
capital was not fully depleted or if shareholders were “innocent” and deserved protections
(Malo de Molina and Martín-Aceña 2011; Sheng 1996). A process called the “accordion
operation” consisted of first, an erosion or dilution of shares held by former shareholders,
followed by recapitalization provided by the Fund, with the fund taking majority ownership
(De Juan 2019). It served two purposes: to amortize potential bank losses and to penalize
shareholders by significantly diluting or writing off their participation (De Juan 2019). In
some instances, the Fund gained control only after applying the accordion operation to the
holding company (Sheng 1996).
The government directly nationalized the politically sensitive Rumasa group, rather than use
the Fund. The group included 20 of the 52 banks affected by the crisis (Klingebiel 2000).
11. Eligible Assets: The Fund could purchase all types of assets, including shares,
loans, and real estate.
The Fund purchased problem assets that were considered undesirable to potential
acquirers, as its goal was to ultimately reprivatize the intervened bank (Sheng 1996). It could
acquire any type of asset, including loans, shares, real estate, or other asset types (De Juan
2019). The Fund did not acquire performing loans, as those were part of the acquisition and
reprivatization (Klingebiel 2000).
12. Acquisition – Mechanics: The Fund determined the specific assets to purchase
from insolvent banks based on negotiations with the institutions acquiring these
banks.
The Fund, together with the Bank of Spain, arranged a prospectus for the sale of a troubled
bank with a set deadline for bids. The prospectus would be sent to selected domestic and
foreign banks and included the maximum value of and specific conditions under which bad
assets could be carved out by the Fund. This turned out to be the key issue in recurrent
negotiations between the Fund and potential buyers.
The offer also outlined the specifics on the support provided by the Fund and the Bank of
Spain (e.g. subsidized interest rates, regulatory forbearance, guarantees against “hidden
liabilities,” etc.). Potential buyers could make counterproposals, which the Fund Board of
Directors would review. Buyers were required to renounce any future claims or legal actions
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against the Fund that would result from differences between expected and realized asset
returns. Lastly, the Board would communicate to the Ministry of Finance the offer chosen.
Then, the Ministry had fifteen days to exercise its option to purchase the shares when the
national interest was a concern. This two-stage mechanism provided checks and balances to
the restructuring efforts (Sheng 1996).
13. Acquisition – Pricing: The Fund purchased assets at face value.
The Fund purchased the non-performing assets of the insolvent banks at book value—that
is, at the nominal value of loans less provisions—because Spanish authorities deemed it
impossible to determine a market price. In doing so, the Fund absorbed any related losses.
As those losses were typically greater than a bank’s equity, this policy was the main
restructuring measure that the Fund adopted. According to the former head of the Fund, “the
share capital increases carried out were intended for recapitalization and were insufficient
for this purpose” (De Juan 2019). Overall, real estate and other asset purchases accounted
for about 80% of Fund transactions and bank equity purchases accounted for 20%. The 24
restructured banks had initial capital of 56 billion pesetas; they wrote off 40 billion pesetas
on bad loans and received 71 billion in capital from the government (see Appendix C). In
comparison, the Fund spent more than 300 billion pesetas to acquire non-performing assets
and real estate in order to facilitate transactions with acquiring banks.
14. Disposal: The Fund’s objective was to dispose of the assets purchased as fast as
possible, while maximizing their recovery value.
In terms of asset management, the main goal of the Fund was to dispose of the assets
purchased as fast as possible while maximizing their recovery value (Klingebiel 2000). By
law, the Fund had to release control of the banks in which it intervened within a year, but
the assets acquired could be sold beyond that timeframe (Sheng 1996).
The Fund sold assets including (a) stock holdings of the Fund in firms or holding companies
or liquidations; (b) real estate; (c) securities; and (d) loans. As for the loans that the Fund
could not sell to the new investors of a bank, sale of mortgage loans and real estate were the
most successful (Klingebiel 2000).
At the time of this writing, there was public data available on the amount the Fund recovered
on the disposal of assets. By the end of 1986 the Fund had accumulated losses of 90 billion
pesetas (Deposit Guarantee Fund 1987).
15. Timeframe: The Fund did not have a pre-established sunset date.
The Fund did not have a defined sunset date. It was legally required to offer the intervened
banks for sale within a year, but the asset management activities did not have a defined
timeframe. The Fund continued to manage assets as of 2000 (Klingebiel 2000).
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III. Evaluation
There is limited evaluation of the Fund despite its central, multi-purpose role in dealing with
the Spanish banking crisis (1977-85). The institutional reforms adopted in Spain to deal with
the banking crisis evolved rapidly as financial conditions deteriorated. Although the
authorities initially underestimated the extent and depth of the banking crisis and provided
only limited deposit guarantees, they soon developed an approach to resolving individual
bank failures that Andrew Sheng, a former World Bank official, has characterized as “fair,
flexible, and pragmatic” (Sheng 1996). Sheng points to the Fund’s private-public structure
and close relationship with the Bank of Spain as having “mitigated the likelihood of
bureaucratization and politicization and fostered a public perception of fairness.” Moreover,
Sheng argues that the separation of the problems of the Rumasa group from the scope of
Fund intervention indicates they were realistic in assessing the appropriate limits of the
Fund's capabilities (Sheng 1996). The Fund focused on smaller banks, which were
“politically easier” to resolve than the banks in the Rumasa group, according to Daniela
Klingebiel, another World Bank official (Klingebiel 2000).
Klingebiel has argued that the Fund was established with appropriate funds and appropriate
powers. She concludes that it was relatively successful compared to asset management
companies established in other countries because it had a targeted mission to dispose of
assets as fast as possible while maximizing the recovery value of the assets. She also notes
that the extent of non-performing loans in the Spanish banking system—under 10%—was
relatively limited compared to other banking crises (Klingebiel 2000).
However, there were several challenges associated with the Fund’s operations. The Spanish
framework for foreclosures and seizures of collateral was inadequate and hampered the
rapid sale of assets. Additionally, the Fund encountered problems with transfer of titles, and
there was lackluster demand for real estate assets. Despite succeeding in selling 26 banks,
the Fund was much less successful in achieving its aim of “rapid disposal of bad assets” that
had been carved out from banks’ balance sheets. This difficulty occurred in the context of a
generally benign macro-environment and increasing real estate prices (Klingebiel 2000).
In the opinion of Aristóbulo de Juan, former CEO of the Fund and the Corporation, the Fund
played a leading and effective role in resolving the majority of bank problems in Spain. He
has pointed to several features that he believes were critical to its operations, including the
contribution of private-sector entities to the cost of the rescues and the transfer of assets at
face value to avoid the technical and litigation-related challenges that an appraisal-based
approach would involve (De Juan 2019).
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Appendix A: Spain Macroeconomic Indicators: 1970-89

Source: Sheng 1996, 88.
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Appendix B: Legislation Timeline

Legislation Timeline
Date
Aug/09/1974
Nov/11/1977
Jan/16/1978
Mar/01/1978

Mar/06/1978

Mar/28/1980

Jun/13/1981
Sep/24/1982

Feb/23/1983

Law

Purpose

Bank reforms of 1974 led to liberalization of the banking industry.
The new measures facilitated opening new banks. Deposit interest
rates and many lending rates were deregulated.
Royal Decree The Deposit Guarantee Fund is created. It was merely a deposit
3048/1977
insurance for up to 500,000 pesetas ($6,500 at the time).
Royal Decree The Fund was able to anticipate funds for banks facing problems,
54/1978
for reasons of public interest and with a vote of 3/4 of the Board.
Therefore, the Fund did not have to wait for insolvency.
The Banking Corporation (Corporación Bancaria S.A.) is created.
It was a private management company owned equally with the
private banks, introduced to handle banks in crisis.
The fund was 500 million pesetas ($6.5 million). Equal
contributions came from the banking industry and the Bank of
Spain.
Decree-Law
The Bank of Spain is authorized to temporarily suspend the
5/1978
executive/administration of a bank.
It was applied to: Asturias, Promoción de Negocios, and Occidental
y Comercial Occidental, which were sold to other bank institutions
soon after being intervened.
Royal Decree- The Deposit Guarantee Fund for Banking Institutions is
Law
institutionalized as a public body governed by the rules of private
4/1980
law. The Fund combined the management functions carried out by
the Corporation with the deposit guarantee function.
The insured deposits increase from 500,000 pesetas to 750,000
pesetas.
Royal Decree Insured deposits increase from 750,000 to 1,500,000 pesetas.
1.620/1981
The ceiling for the Bank of Spain to make contributions to the Fund
is removed.
Royal Decree- The Deposit Guarantee Fund for Credit Cooperatives is created.
Law 18/1982 Both the Fund for Credit Cooperatives and Savings Banks are given
legal powers similar to the Deposit Guarantee Fund for Banking
Institutions.
It is established that if the Bank of Spain anticipates contributions
to the Fund for more than four times the amount given by the
banks, then the Bank of Spain could increase the banks’ percentage
of annual contributions from 0.1% to up to 0.2%.
Royal Decree- Nationalization (expropriation) of the Rumasa group—20 banks
Law 2/1983
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Appendix C: Deposit Guarantee Fund Control and Subscription of New Values

Source: Sheng 1996, 97.
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